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Abstract 
The informal sector has always been assumed to exist but was not studied 
intently until the 1970s when economic events in the US and Europe led 
scholars to consider just how much economic activity was occurring but not 
being accounted for. Since that time it has been studied more vigorously but 
very little progress has been made in understanding it. 
In this paper I develop estimates of the size of the informal sector using 
two different methods. First, a panel of estimates for several Latin American 
countries will be constructed using the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes 
(MIMIC) method for several years. Next, I will create a time-series of esti­
mates for Chile using the Currency Demand (CD) method. 
The MIMIC method was chosen because it allows a complete model of 
informality to be employed as opposed to single-indicator methods such as 
currency demand and physical input. This method has been employed in the 
past by several researchers going back to Frey and Week-Hannemann (1984) 
and is well-documented (though also criticized) by Breusch (2005). 
The CD method is used in the second part because it is well-documented, 
theoretically sound and can be easily employed in a time-series setting. I 
will generally follow procedures used by other authors, making modifications 
where necessary or logical. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Informal 
Economy 
1.1 An Overview 
In economics, the terms "informal sector" and "informal economy" (some­
times referred to as black, hidden, shadow or underground) refer to activity 
that goes on within an economy but is not officially reported. This sector 
can include such things as sales by street vendors, for-profit household pro­
duction and even large-scale industrial production in some cases. Businesses 
that operate informally are able to avoid taxes and regulations but suffer from 
an inability to effectively enforce contracts (since the business is operating 
illegally) and may forgo access to formal credit markets. 
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While it is clear that this phenomenon exists, a standard definition of 
the informal sector is not to be found in the literature. However, there are 
multiple working definitions suggested. 
I will employ the definition found in Feige (1990) under which an activity 
is considered to be a part of the informal economy or sector if it does not 
"adhere to the established rules" present in the formal economy. This means 
that the informal economy can only be defined in the context of the specific 
institutional structure surrounding it. 
An activity that is perfectly legal in one country and therefore a part of the 
formal economy might be illegal and therefore a part of the informal economy 
in another country. Additionally, under this definition, the formality of an 
activity is largely dependent upon the context in which it occurs. Perfectly 
legal activities become part of the informal sector if income is not reported 
or if labor laws are violated. 
Of course adhering to a limited definition of the informal economy is very 
difficult to do when constructing an econometric model since activities which 
are not included in the definition are likely to be picked up by the various 
measurement techniques employed. For example, the drug trade is likely to 
increase cash demand since traffickers may desire liquidity. So despite the 
drug trade being excluded from a given definition of the informal sector, it 
is nonetheless likely to be present to a certain extent in any measurement 
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technique that relies on cash demand. 
Economists have generally concluded that high tax rates and economic 
regulations push individuals into participating in informal sector markets 
but there is no clear consensus in the literature as to the precise relationship 
between the formal and informal economies or as to the exact effect that 
the informal economy has upon the formal economy. Nor is there agreement 
on what, if anything, policymakers should do in response to growing infor­
mal sectors. This makes the concept of the informal sector very difficult to 
measure and even more difficult to evaluate in terms of government policy. 
There are a number of theories that seek to explain these relationships 
but none has gained clear general acceptance. Some authors have found 
that informal economic activity can have a positive, or at least non-negative, 
impact on the formal economy. Choi & Thurn (2005) have found that the 
informal economy can actually complement and improve the dynamics of 
the formal sector by constraining "the corrupt official's ability to introduce 
distortions to the economy for private gains". In this sense, the informal 
sector can serve as a check on corrupt public officials by offering entrepreneurs 
an alternative to (corrupt) formal markets. Similarly, Fleming et al. (2000) 
notes that the informal economy can have positive effects on an economy, 
especially when regulatory burden is great. In this case, the informal sector 
might actually be more efficient than the formal sector, in which case a 
healthy informal economv would increase the overall welfare of the societv. 
" . 
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Finally, Reed (1985) argues that the informal economy, especially as the 
term pertains to home-based production, might be more benevolent than 
commonly perceived and is perhaps less of an economic phenomenon than 
a culturual and historical reality. He views the informal economy as "the 
continuation of pre-industrial activity"; a living fossil of a pre-capitalist world 
rather than an economic curiosity. In his analysis, the informal economy 
is not necessarily something to be "captured", but rather something that 
has always existed naturally and will continue to exist as long as society is 
structured around families and communities. 
However, the prevailing conclusion in the literature is that the informal 
economy is, at least in certain respects, an undesirable intruder; although 
there is clearly a certain amount of debate on this issue. Schneider & Enste 
(2000) suggest that the shadow economy has a drag-like impact on the sur­
rounding economy by consuming resources that could otherwise be used in 
legitimate production. Tanzi (1999) points out that the informal sector can 
have a negative impact on the overall economy if individuals who are offi­
cially considered unemployed choose to work informally. This causes a drain 
on the economy because 1) these individuals may be drawing unemployment 
benefits that they should not be entitled to and 2) if the economy is near 
full-employment a large informal sector can decrease the formal labor pool. 
This could slow down economic growth since labor employed in the informal 
sector is likely to yield lower productivity and informal enterprises are likely 
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to be less capital-intensive than their formal counterparts. 
It is very possible that the informal economy negatively impacts the formal 
economy in other ways as well. For example, the informal economy includes 
activities such as tax evasion and public corruption. These activities weaken 
the state and are threats to stability and growth. Another major component 
of the informal sector is tax evasion. Tax evasion decreases state revenues 
and skews official statistics, both of which could hinder growth, especially 
for underdeveloped or newly-developed countries such as many of those in 
Latin America. 
In addition, there is a near-consensus in the literature that the informal 
sector leads to inaccurate national account statistics. So while it is possible 
that the overall impact of the informal sector on the economy as a whole may 
be positive, there is a need to measure it as accurately as possible; if for no 
other reason than to provide corrected data to policymakers and researchers. 
The lack of understanding about how the informal and formal sectors in­
teract makes such measurement of the informal sector much more difficult. 
Since the informal economy is an amorphous entity hidden from view, it can 
only be measured indirectly. What has gained acceptance, however, is idea 
that the shadow economy has significant effects on economic development 
and policy and must be studied further in order to provide better policies. 
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1.2 Why it Matters 
The informal sector has always been assumed to exist but was not stud­
ied intently until the 1970s when economic events in the US and Europe 
led scholars to consider just how much economic activity was occurring but 
not being accounted for. Since that time it has been studied intently but 
relatively little progress has been made in understanding it. 
The importance of the informal sector rests largely in its potential impact 
on economic policy. Policymakers have little choice but to assume that the 
economic measurements and statistics provided to them by economists are 
accurate and policies are thus formulated according to this information. How­
ever, the informal sector potentially reduces the accuracy of this information 
since informal economic activity is, by definition, not included in traditional 
economic indicators, and can therefore lead to incorrect policy decisions. 
For instance, if a large number of workers were to move from formal em­
ployment to informal employment, official statistics might register a substan­
tial increase in unemployment since informal laborers have a strong incentive 
to report themselves as jobless. This might lead policymakers to implement 
fiscal (social spending) and/or monetary (interest rates) policies designed to 
combat high unemployment when, in reality, people had jobs, just not formal 
ones. 
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While this is an exaggerated example, real policy problems can result from 
incorrect information about the state of the economy. The potential for 
problems is especially acute in developing nations where tax receipts are vital 
for building infrastructure and the small size of the economies mean that even 
relatively small inaccuracies in the economic data can have significant policy 
ramifications. 
This lack of information and the need to provide more accurate measure­
ments to policymakers has driven the study of the informal sector in the 
economic literature. While much work has been done, still more is needed 
in order to develop coherent and testable theories to describe the informal 
sector. 
1.3 Measurement 
The informal sector is still poorly understood compared with other areas of 
the economy. Part of the trouble is that this sector is notoriously difficult to 
measure. This is because individuals operating within this sector have little 
incentive to reveal their activities but strong incentives to conceal them, 
including fear of being punished by the government. 
As a result, scholars are forced to measure these activities using indirect 
methods. One such method relies on currency demand. To employ this 
method the researcher estimates the amount of currency that should be de­
11 

manded in a given economy then observes the amount that is actually de­
manded. It is then assumed that the "extra" currency demand was used in 
the informal sector. This method requires that several strong assumptions 
be made about the informal sector. 
First, it must be assumed that all informal transactions are made in cash 
so as to avoid leaving a paper trail. This is widely thought to be a logical 
assumption although it has been suggested that checks might in fact play 
a larger role than previously thought. Isachsen & Strom (1985) found that 
in 1980 only about 80% of informal transactions in Norway were conducted 
using cash. So it is likely that the currency demand technique underestimates 
actual informal activity. 
Second, the velocity of money must be assumed to be equal in the formal 
and informal sectors. Money velocity means how often a given currency 
note changes hands. This is important since a smaller quantity of money 
might suffice to carry out a large number of informal transactions if those 
transactions occur rapidly enough. 
Finally, a third (and related) assumption is that individuals operating in 
the informal sector do not save money in formal banking institutions, again, 
in order to avoid a paper trail. This assumption has also been challenged 
since it is clear that at least some informal-sector currency does in fact end 
up in formal banks. 
12 
It is useful to note here that individuals who are participating in the in­
formal sector due to social norms or because of a surplus in the formal labor 
market may act differently than those who are operating informally to avoid 
what they view as oppresive taxes or regulations. So, to the extent that 
these groups behave differently, the reliability of these assumptions (and the 
assumptions necessary for most estimation techniques) may vary greatly. 
Another estimation technique that has been employed by Kaufmann & 
Kaliberda (1996), among others, deals with physical inputs (usuallyelectric­
ity). The consumption of electricity is closely related to economic production. 
Using this fact, a researcher can estimate the amount of electricity required 
by an economy to produce a given level of output. Then (as in the currency 
method) the actual demand for electricity is observed and the difference at­
tributed to the informal sector. This method suffers from similar flaws as 
the currency method since much must be assumed about the informal sector 
including that informal production is as energy-efficient as formal production. 
A method that has become popular more recently is the use of latent 
variable estimation techniques. Use of this method does not require that 
any special assumptions be made about the informal sector in advance. This 
method also allows more complex models of the informal economy to be 
employed. 
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To apply this method a set of equations is developed, one using variables 
thought to cause the informal sector and the other using variables thought to 
be caused by the informal sector. The equations are then estimated relative 
to one another which yields coefficients that describe the latent (unknown) 
variable, the informal sector in this case. 
While a number of measurement techniques have been developed, none of 
them is perfect since the informal sector is impossible to observe directly. 
Therefore, it is important for a variety of ideas to be developed and tested as 
thoroughly as possible and for measurements to be updated whenever new 
information or new methods become available. 
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Chapter 2 
Estimating the Informal Sector 
in Latin America Using a 
MIMIC Model 
2.1 Review of Literature 
2.1.1 The MIMIC Method 
The MIMIC (Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes) method has been em­
ployed more recently to estimate the size ofthe informal sector. This method 
has been applied by several scholars including Giles (1999), Schneider and 
Enste (2000) and, in a slightly different form, Frey and Weck (1983). The 
MIMIC method relies on identifying an unobservable variable (in this case 
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the informal economy) and measuring it indirectly using two sets of variables: 
the first consisting of causes, the second consisting of indicators. Using this 
method multiple causes and indicators can be accounted for as opposed to the 
currency demand approach in which only a single indicator variable (money 
demand) is tested. 
The primary causal variables included in most MIMIC models of the infor­
mal economy are: taxation, regulation and "tax morality" (people's attitudes 
toward the state and their willingness to evade taxes). The main types of 
indicators, according to Schneider & Enste (2000) are: monetary indicators 
such as currency demand, labor market indicators such as labor force partic­
ipation and production market indicators such as official economic growth. 
The MIMIC approach is different from the other methods of estimating 
the informal economy in that it is not built upon any specific theory of 
the informal economy. For instance, the currency demand approach is built 
on the assumption that currency demand will increase due to the informal 
sector. The MIMIC method, on the other hand, can be applied using any 
given set of variables, the only assumptions inherent to the method being a) 
the informal economy exists and b) there are certain observable variables that 
are responsible for the size of the informal sector and others that vary along 
with the size of the informal sector. These assumptions are very general and 
thus this method allows for the application of different theories regarding 
the causes and effects of the informal economy. There is a fairly extensive 
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literature, much of it recent, that has attempted to uncover other causes and 
effects of the informal sector and to extend the theory beyond simply taxes 
and regulation. 
2.1.2 Other Issues 
Several authors have begun branching out from the initial hypothesis that 
tax burden and regulation alone are responsible for the informal economy. 
For instance, Giles (1996) models tax-evasion prosecutions against the size of 
the informal sector in New Zealand and finds that the level of prosecutions 
has a significant impact on the size of the informal sector. This suggests that 
properly applied government action can be effective in reducing the size of 
the informal economy. 
Johnson et al. (1998) suggest that regulatory discretion (the amount of 
leeway bureaucrats have to interpret the law) and public corruption rna:", 
have a significant impact on the size of the informal sector. They arrive 
at these conclusions by testing various indicators for these variables against 
existing estimates of the informal sectors for several countries. 
Additionally, Looney (2005) addresses the situation of women in the post­
war Iraqi informal economy and concludes that several non-economic factors 
including religious groups and pre-war political connections are among the 
determinants of the current informal sector. While Iraq is certainly a special 
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case, it is nonetheless possible that such non-economic factors are at work 
in other countries, especially in the developing world. For instance, Chong 
& Gradstein (2007) develop a model that includes income inequality using 
the GINI coefficient for several countries. They determine that inequality, 
especially in the presence of weak institutions as one might expect to find in 
the developing world, can contribute to the informal sector. 
2.1.3 {Jriticisr.ns 
Despite the substantial number of attempts at measurement in the lit­
erature, the question of measurement itself is still somewhat contentious. 
Frey and Pommerehne (1984) note that no concrete theory yet existed to 
explain informality and that the "next step must be to derive a theoretical 
model analyzing the relationship between the official private sector, the hid­
den economy, and the public sector which is connected to both, especially 
via taxation and regulation. " 
Despite the passage of over twenty years, it could be argued that the study 
of the informal sector has progressed very little. Tanzi (1999) concludes as 
much, noting that there are still large discrepancies between estimates for 
a given time and place when different methods are employed. Tanzi (1999) 
and Thomas (1999) agree here, that much more work is needed before the 
informal sector literature can playa substantial role in policymaking. 
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Breusch (2005) has evaluated the MIMIC methodology, concluding that 
estimates obtained from it cannot be trusted blindly. His criticisms include 
undocumented "sliding and scaling" done to the data and authors' methods 
of dealing with nonstationarity of variables. Through replicating several sets 
of MIMIC estimates, he also finds that the results are sensitive to the specific 
units used for the variables. I have attempted to correct for as many of his 
criticisms as possible in my estimates. 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
A conventional approach to estimating the informal economy is based on 
the assumption that cash serves as the most widely used medium of exchange 
in the informal sector (Tanzi, 1982). This so-called transactions approach 
(Feige, 1989) presumes a constant relationship between nominal GDP and 
nominal currency holdings by the public. The size of the informal economy is 
sirnply the difference between the true GDP and the official measured GDP. 
While the use of currency demand looks appealing as a measuring device, the 
currency GDP ratio should obviously depend on several factors. For instance, 
interest rate changes affect the opportunity cost of holding money and could 
change the currency ratio. Similarly, higher inflationary expectations reduce 
the attractiveness of cash in the asset portfolio even for a person operating 
mostly in the informal economy. 
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Still other considerations regarding the use of currency seem relevant in a 
study of the informal sector. The government regulatory regime that includes 
laws and regulations, and the degree of their enforcement, has an important 
bearing on both the costs and benefits of the informal activity. In addition, as 
Chong & Gradstein (2007) argue, a rise in inequality in income distribution 
induces more people to move to the informal sector. This may be more true 
of people who lack a large enough resource endowment of their own and find 
themselves constrained by low access to the credit market. Such people will 
find it easier to undertake an economic activity in the informal sector even if 
it is less productive. This indicates that the extent of self-employment may 
also matter for the size of the informal sector. We do not, however, study 
this aspect of informal activity for lack of relevant data. 
The tax rate on formal income is also likely to affect how individuals and 
firms divide their economic operations between formal and informal parts 
of the economy. A higher tax rate provides an incentive for production to 
switch to the informal sector. However, if an increased supply of public goods 
is made possible by a greater tax revenue, it is possible for formal economic 
activity to stay in the formal sector as well. In this sense, the effect of the 
tax burden becomes an empirical question. 
We take the currency to GDP ratio as one of the key indicators of the 
informal activity in this paper. We then estimate this currency demand 
equation in terms of a set of causal variables that include the interest and 
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inflation rates together with the quality of the regulatory regime, income 
inequality, and tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. 
Apart from the role of money market in shaping informal activity, a more 
direct way in which one can study the informal sector is in terms of the 
output produced there. A second indicator of the informal sector would thus 
be the GDP itself. The fraction of actual (rather than recorded) output 
produced in the informal sector can be related to the causal variables in a 
similar way to the currency demand in that sector. In particular, a greater 
demand for currency would probably be necessary to support an increase in 
real economic activity as well. 
For the set of causal variables it is necessary to choose indicators that 
are likely to push individuals toward participation in the informal sector. 
These could include cultural, economic or political variables and must be 
determined based on a pre-established theoretical idea of how the informal 
sector operates. 
The variables I have chosen to act as informal sector causes are listed in 
Table 2.1. Codes from the Stata statistical package are listed in parentheses. 
I include real investment, and agricultural output as a percentage of total 
output, the real interest rate and inequality among the causal variables that 
affect the informal sector. 
21 

IndicatorsCauses 
Development of the 
informal sector over time 
Zkt ~ 
Figure 2.1: Diagram of MIMIC Model, adopted from Schneider (2005) 
Countries where agriculture is a substantial portion of the economy are 
likely to see increased informal activity due to increased home-based produc­
tion. The interest rate serves as a tax on informal activity because of the cash 
requirements of this sector. Since informal sector participants require large 
amounts of cash, they must forgo interest they might have earned had their 
money been deposited in a financial institution. The link between informal 
activity and inequality has been suggested by Chong & Gradstein (2007) so 
I have included it here. Finally, a lack of investment in an economy is likely 
to push individuals into the informal sector as they seek work and wages. 
To sum up, my indicator variables for the informal sector are currency and 
GDP and the causal variables include real investment, income inequality, 
agricultural production, and the real interest rate in the formal financial 
system. 
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2.2.2 Econometric Model 
Though by definition the informal economy is not directly measurable, an 
inference about it can be made from the pattern of relationships estimated 
for the observed indicators of informality. These indicators are a function of a 
set of causal variables, and the indicators and causes are connected together 
by the latent variable itself. Following Breusch (2005), the relationship can 
be simply described in two equations as follows: 
Yt = ATJt + Et (2.1) 
TJt = "('Xt + ~t (2.2) 
The currency holdings by the public and the official gross domestic product 
(indicators) are the two elements in our y-vector. We represent the multiple 
causal variables by x, and the unobserved latent variable by TJ. "( and A are 
the parameter vectors, Et are the residuals of the indicators and ~t are the 
residuals of the latent variable (the informal sector). The residuals follow 
a joint normal distribution and are independent over time. Substituting 
Eq. (2.2) into Eq. (2.1) we get: 
(2.3) 
23 

and the indicator variance: 
(2.4) 
where'ljJ = var (~) and e = var (c). 
From the multiplicative way in which parameters appear in Eq. (2.3) and 
Eq. (2.4), it is clear that a numeric set of estimates for the separate structural 
parameters is not feasible. We therefore normalize the estimates to express 
one set of parameters relative to the other. Suppose as suggested by Giles 
and Tedds (2002), we set AI, the first element in the A-vector, to 1. This 
then results in the following equations for the two indicator variables Yl and 
Y2: 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
where the coefficients of Xt in Eq. (2.6) are proportional to those in Eq. (2.5) 
with '\2 being the degree of proportionality. The expression "(Xt is simply the 
expected value of Ylt, and E(Y2t) = A2 E(Ylt). 
The structural nature of this technique can be made clear by rewriting 
Eqs. (2.5) and (2.6). The set of structural equations is given in Eqs. (2.7) 
and (2.8) where (2.7) is identical to (2.5). This yields a recursive structure 
for the model wherein a set of exogneous variables determines an endogenous 
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variable which then acts as an exogenous variable to determine another, 
endogenous, variable. 
Ylt = ,Xt + 'Ult (2.7) 
(2.8) 
The two equations of the model can now be estimated simultaneously using 
the maximum likelihood technique which, in this case, means Generalized 
Least Squares. The indicator variables are analogous to endogenous variables 
and the causes to exogenous variables. 
Since it is impossible to retrieve numerical estimates of TJ from these equa­
tions, one of the causal variables must be used for normalization, as noted 
above. The normalization criterion is the explanatory power of the regres­
sion, the equation resulting in a higher R2 will be used for normalization. 
Once this is determined, the relevant variable becomes Yl in the y-vector in 
Eq. (2.3). 
To pick the equation on which to normalize the coefficients, I estimate the 
following equations using ordinary least squares: 
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Variable Definition Description 
Investment per capita (inv) Real investment per capita, expected neg­
ative sign 
Inequality (gini) GIN I Level of inequality, per Chong & Gradstein 
(2007), expected positive sign 
RReal interest rate (realr) p Opportunity cost of operating informally, 
expected negative sign 
Agriculture (agri) Y A Agriculturual production as a share of out­
put, expected positive sign 
Table 2.1: Causal Variables 
2.3 Data 
I work with a panel data set for 23 countries from Latin America. Data 
availability was the sole criterion for the selection of countries other than 
their location. The sample starts in the year 1960 and ends in 2004. The 
overall period of 45 years was divided into 15 periods of three years each. 
Thus each observation consists of a set of variables represented by their three-
year averages. This was done to minimize the impact of annual movements in 
data from their long term trends. Most data were compiled from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) online and International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) yearbooks. The per capita currency holding and per capita GDP are 
expressed in real 2000 US dollars through the use of the annual average 
exchange rates and the US consumer price index. 
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
curr 310 4.91 .75 3.16 6.82 
gdppc 333 3116.79 2942.62 454.16 16311.61 
mv 323 53698.23 60963.02 1543.52 380743.8 
gini 120 51.53 6.04 31 63.5 
realr 178 -6.22 2.72 -13.19 4.42 
agri 250 15.86 8.86 1.21 38.72 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
The inequality variable uses the Gini index and consists of values from 
WIDER-UNU dataset as well as the WDI. Real investment as a percentage 
of GDP was available from Penn World Table online that led to the real per 
capita investment as the investment GDP ratio times GDP. The real interest 
rate was calculated from the nominal rate (one year deposit rate at banks) 
after adjusting for inflation, where inflation was based on the consumer price 
index extracted from the IFS. Agricultural and tax revenue data were col­
lected from the WDI, and data on regulatory quality, available online, were 
compiled by Daniel Kaufmann at the World Bank. Regulatory quality data 
was collected but was not used in estimation of the model because of the low 
number of observations available. This variable should be reintroduced in 
the future when the dataset has been expanded. Summary statistics for all 
variables appear in Table 2.2. 
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2.4 Results 
All the variables shown in Table 2.2, except for the real interest rate, 
approximate a normal distribution. However, because of the inclusion of 
countries that suffered from high and hyper-inflation for some years during 
the sample period, the real interest rate displays a highly positive skewness 
and very thick tails. To avoid these problems, I experimented with different 
transformations of this variable and settled with the logarithm of the squares 
of the original real interest rate. 
Because of missing values for several variables, I was only able to report 
results based on 79 observations for 17 countries. 
From regressions of the two indicators - currency and GDP - results of 
which are included in Appendix A, I find the R2 is higher for real GDP per 
capita (0.86) than for real currency per capita (0.28). This leads to limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation of the two equations 
with normalization performed on the GDP equation. The results appear in 
Table 2.3. 
In the equation for real income per capita, the investment and real interest 
rate perform well though investment seems to be soaking some of the efFects 
of other variables. The inequality variable comes out significant only at the 
13 percent level. Much of the agricultural output seems to take place in 
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Coefficient Std. Error z P 
gdppc 
inv .769 .023 33.14 0 
gini -.007 .005 -1.51 .132 
realr -.017 .010 -1.72 .085 
agn .006 .005 1.14 .255 
curr 
gdppc .597 .007 83.2 0 
Table 2.3: Model Estimation Results 
the informal sector, but agriculture as a percentage of real GDP fails the 
conventional tests of significance. Finally, the equation for currency per 
capita indicates that A2 = 0.597 in our specification of the model where both 
currency and GDP are in their logarithmic forms. 
These results then lead to indices for the size of the informal economy. I 
note that the actual size of the informal economy itself is the less interesting 
or meaningful statistics to report. What matters most is the change in this 
size from one period to the next. The level of the informal activity itself, 
however deficient conceptually, can now be estimated using a benchmark 
for a single year developed using a different methodology. I have chosen to 
calibrate based on 1999/2000 estimates reported by Schneider and Bajada 
(2005) for the sample countries. Estimation results are given in Table 2.4. 
Calibration proceeds by scaling the base year (calibration) estimate for a 
given country over the sample period. Say, for example, that an index has 
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Country 78-80 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95 96-98 99-01 
Bolivia 77.4 68.1 
Brazil 47.9 44.4 42.8 36.0 37.9 40.9 
Chile 10.8 9.2 9.3 12.4 15.4 20.5 23.0 20.3 
Colombia 57.6 54.7 73.5 63.7 41.3 
Costa Rica 21.6 23.0 26.1 26.1 28.5 28.5 27.0 
Dominican Rep. 25.6 26.3 33.4 
EI Salvador 42.6 54.2 46.5 47.1 
Guatemala 56.7 51.9 
Jamaica 42.0 38.0 37.8 
Mexico 25.7 23.6 28.9 26.3 28.1 31.8 
Nicaragua 29.0 41.8 46.9 
Panama 26.2 46.7 63.1 70.3 65.1 
Paraguay 40.6 38.4 29.2 
Peru 49.2 63.8 72.0 60.3 
Venezuela 35.0 37.4 33.0 33.5 32.9 35.1 
Table 2.4: Informal Sector Estimates (%) 
been estimated over several periods using the MIMIC method and call it 
i, and the actual level estimates of the size of the informal sector can be 
called e. So the value of the index for period t is it and the value of the 
size estimate for the same period is et. A calibration estimate for period 1 
(el), calculated using a different method, can then be used to recover level 
estimates for periods 2, 3, ... t. The formula for this is then et+l = et it:! . 
Zt 
Some periods were dropped from the model because of missing data, these 
are simply left blank. Trinidad and Tobago was included in the model but 
the most recent period available from our results was 1990-92 and no estimate 
with which to calibrate it was available. 
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2.4.1 Policy Implications 
Several of the estimates were interesting for various reasons. For one thing, 
Brazil and Paraguay showed marked decreases in their levels of informality. 
This could correspond to improvements in governance and stability. The 
results for Colombia seem to vary greatly, possibly due to the extensive drug 
trade, poor data quality and/or the ongoing armed conflict in this country. 
As mentioned earlier, illicit activities that would normally be considered a 
part of the black economy but not the informal (or gray) economy are almost 
certainly picked up in attempts to measure informality. This could also be 
the case for Guatemala. Our estimates suggest that in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s roughly half of all economic activity was informal. Again, this 
could be the result of poor data quality or external factors, prolonged civil 
war in this case which could certainly cause either of these problems. 
There are certainly other implications of these results that need inves­
tigation including, for instance, Panama (where substantial growth of the 
informal sector has apparently occured since the late 1980s). A longer time 
series for many of the countries would be particularly useful. This might 
be achieved by estimating specific countries individually over a longer time­
senes. 
An institutional/historical analysis of these issues within the context of our 
estimates could also be useful in improving informal sector theory as well as 
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evaluating the reasonableness of our results. 
2.5 Conclusion 
I have presented a set of estimates of the informal sector in several coun­
tries in Latin America using a MIMIC model. Our results suggest that the 
informal sector remains a significant part of the overall economy in most 
countries of Latin America. We find significant changes in the size of the in­
formal sector over time for several countries. A sustained decline in informal 
activity is apparent in some cases. This could possibly be due to improve­
ments in legal extensiveness or effectiveness though our research is not geared 
to identifying these causes. I believe that results in this paper present ample 
opportunity for further study. In particular, we aim to pursue a time series 
framework for selected economies to examine the robustness of the current 
results and achieve a more accurate set of estimates of the informal economy. 
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Chapter 3 
Estimating the Chilean 
Informal Sector Using 
Currency Demand 
3.1 Review of Literature 
The Currency Demand (CD) estimation method is one of the older tech­
niques for estimating the size of the informal sector. In contrast to the 
MIMIC method, the CD method allows the construction of absolute, rather 
than relative, estimates. 
This method, employed by Schneider (1986) among others, entails com­
paring the actual level of demand for money assets against an expected value 
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estimated separately using a money demand equation and assuming no infor­
mal economy. This method is based on the assumption that all transactions 
in the informal economy are conducted using cash, since those engaging in 
the transactions wish to keep them hidden, and that the velocity of money 
is identical in the formal and informal sectors. Therefore, there should be a 
certain amount of "excess" demand for currency above what would normally 
exist if only formal transactions were undertaken. 
While the currency demand method provides estimates that are probably 
economically meaningful, the method has been challenged in the literature 
on a number of points. 
Thomas (1999) notes that a number of "heroic assumptions" are necessary 
to make indirect measurement techniques such as this one work. For example, 
he notes that in order for the currency demand method to yield estimates 
of informal sector size, it must be assumed that there existed some point in 
time (generally the first available data period) at which the informal sector 
did not exist. Therefore, obviously, estimates for a given country in a given 
period might be substantially different depending on the base year that was 
chosen. Thomas also questions the cash-only and equal-velocity assumptions 
as being unrealistic and unsupported. 
Additionally, Schneider (1986) admits that the assumption of cash-only 
transactions may be unrealistic. He also points out that estimating a "nor­
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mal" currency demand equation is difficult and may introduce additional 
inaccuracies. 
This approach has also been criticized by Spiro (1996) because many of 
the authors who apply it define the money supply in such a way as to in­
advertently capture "substantial amounts that represent long-term wealth 
accumulation ". He argues that the method is still valid but that consumer 
expenditure must be substituted for the money supply. 
On the other hand, the currency demand approach is the most commonly 
applied in the literature and is therefore perhaps the most mature measure­
ment technique. This method also benefits from wide availability of necessary 
data, possibilities for cross-country comparisons (again, due to its wide use in 
the literature) and it allows for a simpler development of time-series estimates 
since the data are fairly consistent over time (Schneider 1986, Schneider and 
Enste 2000). 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
The currency demand equations as employed by Tanzi is shown in Eq. (3.1). 
i;2 is the ratio of cash to currency and demand, savings and time deposits 
(M2); TW is weighted average tax rate; ~s is the proportion of wages and 
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salaries in national income; R is the interest rate paid on savings deposits; 
~ is per capita income. Eq. (3.2) is the currency demand equation used by 
Schneider. Here, aI, a2 and a4 > 0 and a3 < 0 and t - i is an annual time 
lag with i = 0, or 1, or 2 ; CUR is the stock of currency demanded by the 
public; P is the price level; VT is the volume of transactions in the formal 
economy; IRis the interest rate; T R is the tax rate. The general form I 
will apply is shown as well in Eq. (3.3). For my equation, C is currency as 
a share of GDP; R is the nominal interest rate paid on demand and savings 
deposits; ~ is per capita income; PJ is the share of private consumption in 
output; T has multiple definitions, see Table 3.1. 
Currency demand can be modeled as a function of the interest rate faced 
by consumers to represent the opportunity cost of holding money, income 
per capita to account for growth over time, wages to account for changing 
patterns of money holding and taxes to proxy changes in the size of the size 
of the informal economy. Other factors could also be considered and the 
precise definitions used for each of these are different from author to author 
depending on data availability and country-specific issues. For example, in 
his estimates for Denmark, Schneider includes a binary variable to account 
for a fundamental change to a "pay as you go" tax system that occurred in 
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the middle of his time series. 
In (Z2) t = 60 + 61 In (1 + TW)t + 62In (~S) t + 63 In Rt + 64 In (~) t 
(3.1) (CUR) (CUR)log -----p- t = aO+a1 log -----p- t-i+a2log (VT)t_i+a3Iog (IR)t_i+a4Iog (T R)t_i 
(3.2) 
Ct = 130 + 131 Ct- 1+ 132Rt + 133 In (~) t + 134 ( P:) t + 135Tt (3.3) 
3.2.2 Econometric Model 
Chile was chosen mainly for its ready availability of reliable data. Rela­
tively little work has been done on the Latin American informal sector. Schol­
ars have preferred to tackle highly developed countries such as the United 
States, Canada, Italy, Denmark, and New Zealand. This is possibly because 
reliable data that fit the requirements of the model, especially related to tax 
rates, are not easy to come by outside of highly developed countries. 
Model estimation was done using the Prais-Winsten technique (prais com­
mand in the Stata software package) 1 a modification of the Cochrane-Orcutt 
procedure employed by Schneider which allows the first observation to be 
included in the estimation. The Prais-Winsten procedure uses a series of 
iterations to estimate and correct for autocorrelation between error terms in 
successive time periods. 
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3.3 Data 
In order to study Chile it was necessary to find a way to measure the tax 
burden faced by individuals in the formal sector through time. Good cross­
sectional data are available on tax burdens in the region for more recent years 
but they do not go back far enough for time-series analysis. Tax revenue as a 
percentage of economic activity was chosen to represent tax burden. Revenue 
data are available from the Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks pub­
lished by the International Monetary Fund. This measure should accurately 
reflect the amount of tax collected per dollar of income. 
However, this definition is not perfect. For example, since it represents an 
average of tax paid per dollar it cannot be known what percentage of the 
population paid more or less. In highly progressive tax systems this measure 
will overestimate the tax burden faced by the majority of consumers. Ad­
ditionally, these variables represent average tax rates rather than marginal 
rates. Theory suggests that individuals considering participation in the in­
formal sector are morc likely to be influenced by marginal rates, but data on 
marginal rates are not available for the countries studied. 
It should be pointed out that only central government tax rates are taken 
into account and that, in some cases, state / province and local taxes may 
vary significantly. However, since information on such tax rates is less consis­
tent than even central government data it is impossible to account for such 
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variation. 
Additionally, the informal sector in Chile (or any country, really) is not 
composed solely of tax evaders. Many individuals may labor informally and 
conduct cash-only transactions either because there are no formal sector jobs 
available or because tradition or other social institutions make informal em­
ployment favorable. So, in reality, we can think of there being two informal 
sectors. One consists of tax evaders and one of small entrepreneurs who are 
either social holdouts or economic refugees. This latter segment might ex­
pand during crises or when the growth rate of the labor force outstrips that 
of the rate of jobs growth. These factors cannot be ignored, especially when 
studying Latin America. However, data are hard to come by so for purposes 
of this paper I will have to assume them away while being mindful of the 
effects of this assumption on the final results. 
Three specific tax variables, as well as lagged versions of these variables, 
are employed. They are described in Table 3.1. Sales tax rates (sales and 
VAT revenue as a percentage of GDP) are tested since such indirect taxes 
affecting commerce might create two-sided incentives for both entrepreneur 
and customer to move into the informal sector. Overall tax revenue is consid­
ered in two ways: 1) tax as a percentage of GDP and 2) tax as a percentage 
of private consumption. The second is employed since it might better reflect 
the actual tax burden by removing the influence of the government spending 
component of GDP on the ratio. No lags are employed since they were found 
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Variable Definition Description 
sStax y Sales tax revenue as a share of output 
TaxI Y 
T Overall tax revenues as a share of output 
TTax2 PC Overall tax revenue as a share of private consumption 
Table 3.1: Tax variable definitions 
to yield insignificant results. 
Variables were tested for stationarity. The dependent variable (currency as 
a share of output), output per capita, consumption as a share of output and 
all three tax variables were non-stationary. This was corrected by changing 
all three variables to their first-difference form. 
6 (~) t = fJo+fJl6 (~) t-I +fJ2Rt+fJ36 In (~) t +fJ46 (P:}) t +fJ56Tt 
(3.4) 
Diverging from the Schneider model applied to Denmark, the currency 
variable will consist of currency held by the public as a share of nominal 
GDP. This definition accurately reflects the demand for currency by the 
public accounting for economic growth. Inclusion of the interest rate accounts 
for the opportunity cost of holding currency and is, in this case, the average 
rate paid on demand and savings deposits. The interest rate is expected to 
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have a negative impact on currency holdings since higher interest rates make 
operating informally more "expensive". The nominal interest rate is used 
because it includes inflation which, as noted by Koreshkova (2006) acts as a 
sort of tax on informal transactions since they require cash. Inflation would 
be expected to depress the informal economy, while a high real interest rate 
should have the same effect. 
Real GDP per capita is used as a scale variable to account for changes in 
income and wealth while private consumption as a share of GDP corrects for 
changes in consumer behavior. There is no specific theoretical expectation 
for the sign on either of these variables, though positive signs would not 
be surprising given that wealth seems to have a diminishing effect on the 
informal sector. 
Variables were checked for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test, results are reported in Appendix B. Currency, real income per capita 
and consumption per capita were non-stationary and were corrected by first­
order differencing. This made calculation of estimates based on the regression 
results more complex. The final model specification is shown in Eq. (3.4). 
3.4 Results· 
Estimation results are listed in Table 3.2 for models including each of the 
three tax variables. Results were generally as-expected. Estimated coeffi­
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!:1curr 
Constant 
!:1currt_l 
ratet 
!:1incomet 
!:1consumptiont 
!:1tax1t 
!:1staxt 
!:1tax2t 
N 
R2 
F(5, 22) 
Rho 
Durbin-Watson 
I II III 
.022 .047 .019 
-.483** -.527*** -.483** 
0 0 0 
-.893* -1.118* -.845 
.026** .021 .034*** 
.028 
.063 
.017 
29 29 29 
.23 .28 .23 
2.69 3.13 2.67 
-.32 -.27 -.33 
2.01 1.96 2.02 
Table 3.2: Model Estimation Results 
cients on the tax variables were positive, though they failed the traditional 
test of significance in all three models. For this reason, p-values are reported 
for the tax variables. The sales tax variable was the most significant version 
of the model, just out of the 15% level. However, gven the appropriate signs 
on the coefficients and the firm theoretical importance behind them I feel 
that these results are acceptable. 
The model results are converted into estimates of the size of the informal 
sector by holding the tax rate variable fixed and calculating the difference 
between the actual observed level of currency demand and the theoretical 
level, given the lower tax rate. This is then converted to a percentage relative 
to official GDP by dividing the difference between actual and theoretical 
currency demand by the actual amount of currency (MO). I assume that the 
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velocity of money in the formal and informal sectors is equal at any given 
point in time, otherwise this ratio would not yield a meaningful result. The 
equation used to compute the expected currency demand is given as Eq. (3.5). 
This method has a somewhat peculiar, though reasonable, interpretation. 
The currency demand estimates yielded actually represent expected currency 
demand in period t given a decrease in taxes from Tt - I (actual) to either Tlow 
or To. In other words, in each period I am asking " what would have happened 
if taxes had been changed at the start of this period?". 
(~) t = (30+(3If1 (~) t_I+(32 Rt+(33f1ln (~) t+(34 f1 (P~) t+(35 ([TlowITo]- Tt- I )- (~) t-I 
(3.5) 
This was adopted because a more straightforward interpretation was not 
possible given the differenced tax and currency variables. 
3.5 Analysis of Results 
3.5.1 Artifacts and Trends 
Probably the most noticeable part of Figures 3.1 and 3.2 is the spike that 
occurs between 1998 and 2000. This artifact is difficult to explain but does 
correspond roughly to the 1998-1999 financial crisis in Brazil. While these 
countries do not share a border. it is still possible that the sudden reduction 
in confidence in the Brazilian economy spurred a sharp increase in foreign 
demand for Chilean Pesos, which could cause this result. 
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Figure 3.1: Estimates Based on to 
There is a visible downward trend among the CD estimate series. This is 
possibly caused by the steady economic growth Chile has experienced over 
the past 30 years. Figure 3.3 demonstrates this relationship. The oscillations 
evident in the informal sector data are possibly random noise. Note that the 
spike in 1998-2000 corresponds to a contraction in the Chilean economy. 
Its size may be disproportionate due to an additive effect with the other 
fluctuations present in the estimate series. 
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I I II II III III 
Year 11ow To 11ow To 11ow To 
1978 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.1 0.16 
1979 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.04 0.09 
1980 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.1 
1981 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.1 
1982 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0 0.05 
1983 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.06 
1984 0.05 0.1 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.09 
1985 0.01 0.06 0 0.06 -0.01 0.05 
1986 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.12 
1987 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 
1988 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.12 
1989 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 
1990 0.04 0.1 0.04 0.1 0.04 0.1 
1991 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.06 
1992 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.09 
1993 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.08 
1994 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 
1995 0 0.05 0.01 0.06 0 0.05 
1996 0 0.05 0 0.05 0 0.05 
1997 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.07 
1998 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.02 
1999 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.13 
2000 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 
2001 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.08 
2002 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 
2003 0 0.05 0 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
2004 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 
2005 0.04 0.1 0.04 0.1 0.04 0.1 
2006 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.1 
Table 3.3: Informal Economy Estimates 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
4.1 Comparison and Assessment of Accuracy 
As with any model, it is important to check whether the results of these 
estimates are reasonable. One method of doing this is to compare them 
with other estimates arrived at using different methods. Figure 3.4 shows 
three-year averages of currency demand estimates plotted alongside the cor­
responding MIMIC estimates for Chile as well as a set of estimates calculated 
by Schneider for two-year periods corresponding to part of my sample period. 
Clearly the series calulated in this paper do not track one another, making 
both estimates somewhat suspect. 
The two sets of estimates seem to roughly follow one another through the 
first three periods (nine years), but the CD estimates subsequently continue 
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to fall while the MIMIC estimates rise. Since estimation of the informal 
sector is still a controversial and poorly-developed science (more of an art 
actually), it is not completely unexpected that two sets of estimates, arrived 
at using different methods, would disagree. 
On the other hand, the Schneider estimates, which were calculated using 
a MIMIC model correspond closely to my MIMIC estimates. The similar 
methodology and similar data used make this correlation unsurprising. 
4.2 Future of Informal Sector Estimation 
As my results clearly demonstrate, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
associated with estimating the size of the informal sector. A number of, 
perhaps, questionable assumptions must be made and sometimes unreliable 
macroeconomic data must be relied upon. 
Despite these problems, it remains clear that reliable measurements of the 
informal sector would serve an important purpose for eocnomists. An under­
standing of how this segment of the economy operates would give economists 
a better overall understanding of the relative economic health of a country 
and allow a better understanding of a variety of issues from trade to growth. 
It is likely that gathering primary data in the form of surveys will be 
important to expanding our ability to measure the informal sector. While 
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expensive and sometimes difficult to conduct, survey methods represent an 
important, and thus far under-utilized, tool for the study of the informal 
.sector. 
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Appendix A 
Intermediate Regression 
Results for MIMIC Model 
Included below are results from the regression models that were estimated 
in order to choose a normalization variable for the MIMIC model. Note the 
the R2 is higher for the model with real GDP as its dependent variable. 
reg logcpc agriy3yr rdeprate2 gini33yr invy3yr 
Source SS df MS Number of obs 79 
-------------+------------------------------ Fe 4, 74) 5.36 
Model I 6.13042812 4 1.53260703 Prob > F 0.0008 
Residual I 21.1627189 74 .285982687 R-squared 0.2246 
-------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.1827 
Total I 27.293147 78 .349912141 Root MSE .53477 
logcpc I Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
agriy3yr -.0380415 .0125156 -3.04 0.003 -.0629793 -.0131036 
rdeprate2 -.0085792 .0249715 -0.34 0.732 -.0583359 .0411775 
gini33yr -.0273745 .0129729 -2.11 0.038 -.0532236 -.0015253 
invy3yr -.0048749 .0174063 -0.28 0.780 -.0395578 .029808 
_cons 6.588253 .7192038 9.16 0.000 5.155208 8.021298 
reg logypcOOdlr agriy3yr rdeprate2 gini33yr invy3yr 
Source I SS df MS Number of obs 79 
-------------+------------------------------ Fe 4, 74) 37.67 
Model I 17.2939037 4 4.32347592 Prob > F 0.0000 
Residual I 8.49262291 74 .114765174 R-squared 0.6707 
-------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.6529 
Total I 25.7865266 78 .330596495 Root MSE .33877 
logypcOOdlr I Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
agriy3yr -.0782394 .0079284 -9.87 0.000 -.0940371 -.0624417 
rdeprate2 -.0167632 .015819 -1.06 0.293 -.0482833 .0147569 
gini33yr -.0090745 .0082181 -1.10 0.273 -.0254495 .0073005 
invy3yr -.0031793 .0110266 -0.29 0.774 -.0251504 .0187917 
cons 9.18568 .4556036 20.16 0.000 8.27787 10.09349 
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Appendix B 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Results for Currency Demand 
Model 
. dfuller D.tax, lags(l) regress trend 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs 27 
---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------­
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Statistic Value Value Value 
Z(t) -4.138 -4.362 -3.592 -3.235 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0055 
D2.tax Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
D.tax 
L1. -1.101668 .2662057 -4.14 0.000 -1.652357 -.55098 
LD. .3349744 .2057357 1.63 0.117 -.0906222 .760571 
_trend .0602097 .0290541 2.07 0.050 .0001067 .1203128 
cons -1.019086 .5014268 -2.03 0.054 -2.056366 .0181948 
. dfuller D.tax2, lags(l) regress trend 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs 27 
---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------­
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Statistic Value Value Value 
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Z(t) -3.706 -4.362 -3.592 -3.235 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) ~ 0.0220 
D2.tax2 Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
D.tax2 
L1. -.9841234 .2655706 -3.71 0.001 -1.533498 -.4347487 
LD. .0542878 .1990198 0.27 0.787 -.3574159 .4659916 
_trend .0046839 .0171538 0.27 0.787 -.0308014 .0401691 
_cons -.145906 .2900075 -0.50 0.620 -.7458322 .4540201 
. dfuller D.tax3. lags(l) regress trend 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs 
---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------­
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Statistic Value Value Value 
Z(t) -3.264 -4.362 -3.592 -3.235 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) ~ 0.0724 
D2.tax3 Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
D.tax3 
L1. -.9711845 .2975674 -3.26 0.003 -1.58675 -.3556195 
LD. .2241241 .2275549 0.98 0.335 -.246609 .6948572 
trend .1036837 .0533624 1.94 0.064 -.0067048 .2140722 
_cons -1. 359328 .8949997 -1.52 0.142 -3.210776 .4921197 
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Appendix C 
Currency Demand Regression 
Outputs 
prais c3 c3_1 rate consumption rincome tax 
Iteration 0: rho 0.0000 
Iteration 1 : rho -0.3981 
Iteration 2: rho -0.6181 
Iteration 3: rho -0.6606 
Iteration 4: rho -0.6650 
Iteration 5: rho -0.6654 
Iteration 6: rho -0.6655 
Iteration 7: rho -0.6655 
Iteration 8: rho -0.6655 
Prais-Winsten AR(l) regression iterated estimates 
Source I SS df MS Number of obs 29 
-------------+------------------------------ F( 5, 23) 1093.77 
Model I 2.3331e+l0 5 4. 6662e+09 Prob > F 0.0000 
Residual I 98121486.9 23 4266151.6 R-squared 0.9958 
-------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared 0.9949 
Total I 2.342ge+10 28 836752718 Root MSE 2065.5 
c3 I Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Coni. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
c3_1 .3926436 .0891535 4.40 0.000 .2082155 .5770717 
rate 22.92862 37.10195 0.62 0.543 -53.82261 99.67985 
consumption -1839.814 8924.26 -0.21 0.838 -20301.05 16621.42 
rincome 33313.41 4571.007 7.29 0.000 23857.56 42769.26 
tax 59918.97 15511.47 3.86 0.001 27831.04 92006.89 
cons -456292.6 65302.71 -6.99 0.000 -591381.5 -321203.6 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
rho I -.6654619 
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Durbin-Watson statistic (original) 2.771175 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.454797 
. prais c3 c3_1 rate consumption rincome tax2 
Iteration 0: rho 0.0000 
Iteration 1 : rho -0.3237 
Iteration 2: rho -0.5305 
Iteration 3: rho -0.5789 
Iteration 4: rho -0.5850 
Iteration 5: rho -0.5856 
Iteration 6: rho -0.5857 
Iteration 7: rho -0.5857 
Iteration 8: rho -0.5857 
Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression iterated estimates 
Source I SS df MS Number of obs 29 
-------------+------------------------------ F( 5, 23) 668.36 
Model I 2.0655e+10 5 4. 1310e+09 Prob > F 0.0000 
Residual I 142157453 23 6180758.81 R-squared 0.9932 
-------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared 0.9917 
Total I 2.0797e+10 28 742753469 Root MSE 2486.1 
c3 I Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
c3_1 .4697831 .1055004 4.45 0.000 .2515388 .6880273 
rate 31.68574 46.81291 0.68 0.505 -65.15414 128.5256 
consumption -2981.273 13155.31 -0.23 0.823 -30195.1 24232.55 
rincome 28247.79 5382.213 5.25 0.000 17113.84 39381. 75 
tax2 97785.05 58502.86 1.67 0.108 -23237.34 218807.4 
cons -383197.9 77032.45 -4.97 0.000 -542551.6 -223844.1 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
rho I -.5857288 
Durbin-Watson statistic (original) 2.455993 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.150922 
prais c3 c3_1 rate consumption rincome tax3 
Iteration 0: rho 0.0000 
Iteration 1 : rho -0.3928 
Iteration 2: rho -0.6151 
Iteration 3: rho -0.6604 
Iteration 4: rho -0.6653 
Iteration 5: rho -0.6658 
Iteration 6: rho -0.6659 
Iteration 7: rho -0.6659 
Iteration 8: rho -0.6659 
.. lTV' 
Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression iterated estimates 
Source I SS df MS Number of obs 29 
-------------+------------------------------ F( 5, 23) 1107.90 
Model 2.3346e+10 5 4.6692e+09 Prob > F 0.0000 
Residual I 96932272.2 23 4214446.62 R-squared 0.9959 
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-------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.9950 
Total I 2.3443e+l0 28 837245115 Root MSE 2052.9 
c3 I Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
c3_1 .3749322 .0900605 4.16 0.000 .1886279 .5612365 
rate 26.78378 36.64473 0.73 0.472 -49.02162 102.5892 
consumption 17992.18 8699.321 2.07 0.050 -3.741266 35988.09 
rincome 34234.18 4619.845 7.41 0.000 24677.3 43791. 05 
tax3 37947.03 9672.485 3.92 0.001 17937.97 57956.09 
cons -481228.5 67139.57 -7.17 0.000 -620117.3 -342339.7 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------­
rho I -.6658595 
Durbin-Watson statistic (original) 2.768310 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.456096 
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